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Abstract: In January the Trade and Industry
Secretary, Stephen Byers, introduced the Utilities Bill
into the House of Commons. The bill will enable the
energy regulator Ofgem to completely revamp the way
wholesale electricity is traded in England and Wales.
But do we have any reason to believe that the new
electricity trading arrangements will be an
improvement upon the existing ones? The answer is
no.
Introduction
For the past two years Britain’s energy regulator,
Ofgem, has been engaged in the task of reviewing
the way electricity is traded between generators and
electricity supply companies in England and Wales.
This ‘review of the electricity trading arrangements’
(RETA, for short) was initiated in October 1997 by
John Battle, then Minister for Science, Energy and
Technology. The process is now nearing its
conclusion, and a redesigned electricity market for
England and Wales has been proposed, tested, and
will soon be ready for implementation.
Both the regulator and the Trade and Industry
Secretary promise a ten per cent reduction in
wholesale electricity prices with the introduction of
the new electricity trading arrangements. But do we
have any reason to believe that these new
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arrangements will in any sense be an improvement
upon the existing ones?
The answer is no. Economists who pay attention to
such matters are near unanimous that the new
trading arrangements are badly misconceived and
poorly designed. The expectation, if anything, is
that the new market design is likely to make things
worse rather than better. This is despite the fact that
the problems with the existing wholesale electricity
market have long been well-known and well-
understood. How has this remarkable state of affairs
come about?
The Old and the New
Since 1990 all electricity in Britain has been traded
through the electricity ‘pool'. The pool is a day-
ahead auction in which generators announce how
much electricity they are willing to supply at each
possible price for the following day. Then demand
is estimated and market prices result from equating
demand and supply. Generators whose bids are
below the market-clearing price, i.e. ‘in merit’, are
called on to supply power.
Although a radical and innovative market design
when introduced in 1990, the pool has been beset
by a host of problems. A complex set of bidding
rules and payments to participants has made its
operation complex and opaque. The dominant
generators have exercised their market power in
ways that were as predictable as they were long in
being recognised by the regulator. The capacity
payment mechanism has been manipulated. There is
little or no provision for effective demand side
bidding. Transmission pricing signals are
inadequate or non-existent. And so on.1
The new electricity trading arrangements seek to
resolve these problems by replacing the pool with a
series of forward markets and a short term
‘balancing’ market. Market participants will now be
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expected to contract bilaterally for the exchange of
energy in advance. They will then tell the System
Operator what they plan to produce and consume.
Traders will be paid their balancing market bids to
change their plans if this is necessary to match
overall supply and demand on the day. Deviations
from forward contracts not ‘rebalanced’ in the
market will be priced afterwards using the average
of balancing mechanism bids.
Mis-diagnosing the Problem
Was such a radical overhaul of the market
necessary? Everybody accepts that prices in the
pool have been too high, and too easily
manipulated. But the RETA programme got off to
an unfortunate start by immediately mis-diagnosing
the problem which it had been set up to resolve. The
electricity regulator decided that the form of the
electricity pool auction - a uniform-price auction -
was at least partly to blame for the excessively high
pool prices experienced since privatisation.2.He
hoped that this could be rectified by adopting a
‘discriminatory-price,’ or ‘pay your bid’, auction
instead. For the uninitiated we will briefly explain
what these terms mean.
In a uniform-price auction, every bidder who buys
or sells a unit pays or receives the same market-
clearing price for it. Since this price is determined
by the bid on the marginal accepted unit, it is
sometimes referred to as the ‘marginal’ price. In
electricity markets - a world of near impenetrable
jargon - it goes under the name of ‘system marginal
price’, or SMP.
In a discriminatory-price auction, on the other hand,
bidders pay or receive whatever they have bid on
each unit bought or sold. That is, if a generator
offers to supply the first 50MW of energy at
£5/MWh and an additional 10MW at £10/MWH,
then if these bids are successful, the generator will
receive precisely those prices for those quantities.
Similarly if a buyer (an electricity ‘supplier’ in
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industry parlance), submits bids to purchase
100MW at £15/MWh and an additional 50 MW at
£8/MWh, these are the prices which the supplier
will pay on those quantities.
Both uniform-price and discriminatory-price
auctions are commonly used in financial and other
markets, and there is now a voluminous economic
literature devoted to their study. Recent research
has been particularly focused upon comparing the
outcomes of each type of auction format under
different sets of circumstances.3
Without bothering to consult this literature, Ofgem
decided that a discriminatory-price auction would
obviously be more competitive than a uniform-price
auction. Their reasoning seems to have been that
when market prices are set by the marginal accepted
unit, i.e. the marginal generator, this provides
greater incentives for non-competitive bidding than
does a ‘pay your bid’ auction. Ofgem’s first
proposal was therefore to scrap the existing
electricity pool with its SMP-determined prices, and
use a discriminatory-price auction format in their
new market designs.
Economists could be forgiven for being bemused by
such arguments. Not least because two Nobel
Laureates in economics - Milton Friedman and
Merton Miller - famously made precisely the
opposite claim in advising on the design of auctions
for US Treasury bills in the early 1990s. Friedman
and Miller argued that a uniform-price auction
would obviously be more competitive than a
discriminatory-price auction.
It was soon realised however that Friedman and
Miller were drawing incorrect parallels between
auctions for a single good (such as a painting at
Sotheby’s), for which a more satisfactory theory
exists, and multiunit auctions such as those for
Treasury bills, and electricity. In multiunit settings
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the comparison between these two auction forms is
much more complex. In fact, neither theory nor
empirical evidence tell us that discriminatory-price
auctions perform better than uniform-price auctions
in markets such as those for Treasury bills4 or
electricity. 5 So there is no evidence at all that a
discriminatory-price auction will produce more
vigorous price competition or result in lower
electricity prices.
Mis-designing the Market
There may be nothing inherently wrong with the
proposal to replace the existing electricity pool with
a series of forward markets and a ‘balancing’
mechanism. Similar, though not identical, market
arrangements have been adopted in Norway and
California. There is a great deal wrong with what is
being proposed in practice however.
The most serious flaw is that the discriminatory-
price auction format has led to balancing market
prices that are ‘manipulable’. This means that
traders will not simply be able to exercise whatever
market power they may have by withholding
capacity and raising prices in the market. They will
also be able to manipulate the price setting
mechanism itself, and make large sums of money in
the process.
That this possibility exists was clear to any trained
eye at the outset, but it was proven rather
dramatically when the market design was recently
put to an experimental test.6 One clever trader (and
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a co-author of this article) constructed two different
ways of manipulating the balancing market price.
Both involved writing specious contracts in the
forward market and then submitting specious
quantities and prices to the balancing market. As a
consequence the trader made tens of millions of
(fictional) pounds from the embarrassed
experimenters in a matter of a few days.
The first task of a market designer is to ensure that
opportunities for manipulating prices are
eliminated, or at least reduced to an absolute
minimum. Early experiments or market simulations
should be primarily aimed at identifying any such
opportunities for market manipulation which may
have survived critical scrutiny. It is a hopeless
exercise to test for stable or ‘steady state’ market
behaviour while opportunities for outright
manipulation exist, although this is what the
experimenters employed by the regulator thought
they were doing.7 Where one trader has gone, many
will soon follow. Far from converging to a ‘steady
state’, market behaviour will eventually be
dominated by the ‘manipulators’.
New pricing rules have been suggested to address
this particular form of manipulation, adding
additional layers of complexity to the market, but
other opportunities for playing the system remain.
This fact has been belatedly recognised by the
regulator, who has now proposed that generators
sign a “good conduct” agreement before the new
trading arrangements are introduced. But the
generators have so far  refused to sign on the dotted
line, and the matter may ultimately be sent to the
Competition Commission for adjudication. We
could not ask for a clearer demonstration of the
futility of introducing a flawed market design than
the heavy-handed regulation now required to make
it work.
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There are other serious problems with the balancing
market being created by our inexperienced market
designers.  The discriminatory-price auction format
has led to an arbitrary and increasingly complex
pricing mechanism which bears little or  no
relationship to underlying economic realities. And
the mistakes of the past are being replicated in the
new market arrangements. To provide one example,
a notorious feature of the England and Wales
electricity pool is that it pays generators not to
produce when transmission constraints force them
‘out of merit’. The proposed balancing market
similarly contains provisions to compensate
generators when transmission constraints prevent
them from fulfilling their contractual obligations.8
Another example is provided by the rules which
allow traders to revise or revoke their quantity bids
into the balancing market, despite the well-known
opportunities for market manipulation that this
affords participants.
Conclusions
The existing electricity pool suffers from well-
known defects. A complex set of bidding rules and
payments to participants has made its operation
complex and opaque. The dominant generators have
exercised their market power in ways that were
perfectly predictable from standard economic
analysis.9 The market’s ‘bells and whistles’ have
been manipulated, making the problems even
worse.
All of these issues should have been addressed, and
rectified, by the trading arrangements review. None
required the complete abandonment of the existing
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market arrangements, and certainly not their
replacement by untried and untested market forms
which even the inexperienced quickly recognise as
being manipulable. Indeed, independent
comparative analyses which have been undertaken
to date to test the performance of the two market
types find that the current ‘uniform-price’ auction
performs at least as well or better than ‘pay your
bid’ bilateral trading.10
The sine qua non of this market reform process, as
the Secretary of State has pointed out, is that it
should result in lower electricity prices. If there are
lower prices, it won't be the result of the policy
choices made to date. The market design being
implemented with great haste this autumn contains
flaws that make it unlikely it will survive for long in
its current form. As traders quickly become expert
in manipulating the market it is likely that the
market will derail itself and require even stronger
regulation than is currently envisaged, or perhaps
redesign.
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